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THE CRASH OF DELTA FLIGHT 191: ARE THE
NIGHTMARES COMPENSABLE?
ROBIN PERLMAN
The ride got rougher and rougher. It seemed like there was some-
thing on top of the plane, pushing it to the ground. The pilot tried
to pull out of it. The speed of the engines increased. We started
rocking back and forth. Then we were tossed all around. I saw an
orange streak coming toward me on the left side of the floor. I
thought we were going to explode. At that point, I said, 'well, it's all
over. 'IO N ITS FINAL DESCENT into Dallas/Fort Worth
("D/FW") airport on Friday, August 2, 1985, at 6:05
p.m., Delta Airline Flight 191 emerged through a sky that
had become suddenly darkened by an unexpected storm.2
The wide-bodied Lockheed L- 1011 carrying 162 people
plunged abruptly downward short of runway 17. The
plane dipped its left wing, skidded over rush-hour traffic
on State Highway 114, 4 bounced, 5 slid into a water-stor-
age tank and burst into a large orange ball of flames.6
The crash was the first major air crash at D/FW airport,
the worst in Texas history, and the fourth worst aviation
I "Like A Wall of Napalm," TIME, Aug. 12, 1985, at 18 [hereinafter cited as
TIME].
2 Id. Flight 191 was making an intermediate stop at Dallas/Fort Worth airport
on its flight from Ft. Lauderdale to Los Angeles. Id.
Delta 191: Death in Dallas, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 12, 1985, at 30 [hereinafter cited as
NEWSWEEK]. The triple-engine Lockheed L-10 11 has a seating capacity of 240 to
300 people. The plane is known for its quietness, fuel efficiency, comfort, de-
pendability, and safety. Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 3, 1985, at A20, col. 2.
4 Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 3, 1985, at AI, col. 4.
See id. at col. 4.
" NEWSWEEK, supra note 3, at 30.
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accident in the United States.7 Miraculously, thirty-one
survivors either walked away from the wreckage or were
carried out of the debris and taken to area hospitals.8 As
some family members and friends gathered at the hospi-
tals, others huddled in nearby hotel rooms or coffee shops
to await news of the identification of their loved ones. 9
The survivors and even some bystanders experienced
emotions of terror, panic, frustration, and guilt generated
by a tragedy that brought man face to face with his own
mortality.' 0
The crash of Flight 191 has, as expected, generated nu-
merous lawsuits by decedents' estates, survivors, and by-
standers." Some of the decedents and survivors and
many of the bystanders are Texas residents and will there-
fore file suit in Texas. The lawsuits in Texas that have
been or may be filed can be categorized according to the
status of the plaintiffs. First, on behalf of the decedents,
actions may be brought under the Texas Wrongful Death
Act 12 and the Texas Survival Statute.' 3 Second, the survi-
Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 3, 1985, at A24, col. 1, 6.
TIME, supra note 1, at 18. The majority of the survivors were seated in the
plane's tail section which broke off on impact. NEWSWEEK, supra note 3, at 30. To
date, 5 of the 31 survivors have died from injuries caused by the crash. The death
total stands at 137. One person remains in a rehabilitation center.
' Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 5, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
,0 Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 7, 1985, at A10, col. 1, 5. See infra notes 256-311
and accompanying text.
1 Upon defendants' motion, the multi-district litigation panel consolidated ap-
proximately 48 lawsuits in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Texas in Fort Worth. The trial, set for April 27, 1987, will determine the liability
arising from the accident. In re Aircrash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport on Aug. 2,
1985, MDL 657 (N. D. Tex. Dec. 20, 1985).
12 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (Vernon Supp. 1941-85). This act states
"[w]hen an injury causing the death of any person, occurring either within or
without this state, is caused by the wrongful act, [or] neglect . . . of another per-
son, . . . [or] corporation .... such persons . . . shall be liable in damages for
the injuries causing such death." Id. The wrongful death claim "may be brought
by the surviving husband, wife, children, and parents of the person whose death
has been caused .. " TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4675 (Vernon 1952).
Although an analysis of a wrongful death cause of action is beyond the scope of
this Comment, the statutorily defined plaintiffs from Delta 191 may be able to
recover under the statute. However, it is unclear what will be recovered and by
whom. Until recently the Texas rule was that a plaintiff could only recover for the
pecuniary loss as a result of the death. See March v. Walker, 48 Tex. 372, 375
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vors may have a cause of action for their actual damages
including pain and suffering.' 4 Third, witnesses and third
parties may attempt to recover damages for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress. 15
This Comment will focus on the causes of action avail-
able in Texas which may allow survivors and witnesses of
the Delta crash to recover damages for emotional distress.
It will begin with a review of Texas history and develop-
ment of negligent infliction of emotional distress.' 6 The
concept of emotional damage will be analyzed by examin-
ing specific types of air crash cases in various jurisdic-
tions.' 7 This will be followed by a review of the history
and development of pain and suffering damages in
Texas. 18 The next section relates emotional damages to
air crash cases in other jurisdictions.' 9 Finally, this Com-
ment will examine facts and statements made about the
(1877). However, the Texas Supreme Court in Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d
249, 251 (Tex. 1983) allowed a mother to recover for loss of society and compan-
ionship and damages for mental anguish from the wrongful death of her minor
child.
The courts are split on whether Sanchez extended the right to recover for loss of
companionship and mental anguish to survivors other than parents of minor chil-
dren. See Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Yowell, 674 S.W.2d 447, 462 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1984, writ granted) (court concluded that Sanchez limited recovery of loss
of companionship to parents of minor children); City of Houston v. Stoddard, 675
S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex. App.-Houston [list Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.) (court
followed Sanchez concurrence holding a parent could recover for mental anguish
resulting from death of adult daughter); Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Dawson, 662
S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ refd n.r.e.) (court ex-
panded Sanchez by holding that surviving spouse could recover loss of consortium
damages when death results).
13 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5525 (Vernon 1958). The statute allows for
causes of action to be brought "in favor of the heirs and legal representatives and
estate of such injured party . . . and may be instituted and prosecuted as if such
person . . . were alive."
The legal representatives of the decedents or injured may seek the damages
which that party could have recovered including pain and suffering. A discussion
of these causes of actions is beyond the scope of this Comment and will not be
addressed.
'4 See infra notes 171-249 and accompanying text.
,5 See infra notes 21-170 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 21-127 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 110-170 and accompanying text.
68 See infra notes 171-206 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 207-249 and accompanying text.
1040 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
Delta Flight 191 crash and consider the possible emo-
tional damage recoveries that may exist.2 0
I. BYSTANDER'S ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A. Texas
1. Pre-Dillon v. Legg
The first Texas decisions allowing recovery for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress required that the
plaintiff actually be "impacted" by the defendant's ac-
tions.2' Subsequent to those decisions the courts moved
away from the strict "impact" test and adopted a pure
negligence approach based upon foreseeability. 22 The
courts required that the plaintiff simply suffer a physical
injury23 After adopting this liberal test for awarding
mental anguish damages, the Texas courts returned to a
stricter approach based upon the zone of danger test. 24
Under the zone of danger test, initially proclaimed as
more objective than previous tests, a plaintiff could re-
cover for emotional damages only if he were in the zone
of danger of defendant's negligent conduct.2 5 Texas
courts are currently split as to whether the zone of danger
test requires the plaintiff to exhibit physical manifesta-
tions to verify his emotional distress.26
The question of a bystander's right of recovery in Texas
for damages caused by the negligent infliction of emo-
20 See infra notes 250-311 and accompanying text.
2 See PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 at 362-65 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON]. See, e.g-., Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161,
142 A.2d 263 (1958); Brisboise v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 303 S.W.2d 619
(Mo. 1957).
22 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 21, at 364. See e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386
Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982); Fournell v. Usher Pest Control Co., 208 Neb.
684, 305 N.w.2d 605 (1981).
23 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 21, at 364. An example of physical injury
would be a pregnant woman suffering a miscarriage as a result of an emotional
trauma caused by viewing a negligent act by defendant.
24 See infra notes 42-60 and accompanying text.
2-5 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 21, at 365.
26 See infra notes 89-109 and accompanying text.
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tional distress has been robustly debated. 27  The princi-
ple of negligent infliction of emotional distress allows a
bystander to recover for emotional damages from viewing
the negligent infliction of physical harm to another.28
The primary reasons for limiting the recovery of these
damages are: 1) the difficulty of allowing recovery for
harm that is often temporary; 2) the possibility that the
claims will be falsified or imagined; and 3) the perceived
unfairness of imposing increased financial burdens upon a
merely negligent defendant, whose conduct appears re-
mote from the wrongful act.2 9
In Hill v. Kimball,30 the Texas Supreme Court adopted
the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress but held that a bystander need not prove "im-
pact" in order to recover.3 ' To limit the defendant's lia-
bility and the chance for feigned claims, the court stated
that in the absence of impact the mental anguish must re-
sult in physical injury. 2 In Hill, the plaintiff brought suit
-7 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 21, at 362-65.
2a Id. at 361-62.
29 Id. at 360-61.
3o 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
' Id. In order to limit recovery for bystanders, courts in other jurisdictions
originally required a showing of some "impact" upon the plaintiff as a precondi-
tion to recovering damages. For a discussion of the impact rule, see Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) (a woman frightened by a
horse car which stopped with the woman betweeen two horses' heads was not
allowed recovery for her fright and subsequent miscarriage because there was "no
immediate personal injury"). The plaintiff had to prove impact by showing that
the defendant's conduct set some force in motion which came in contact with the
plaintiffs person. E.g., Consolidated Traction Co. v. Lambertson, 59 N.J.L. 277,
36 A. 100 (1896) (passenger in wagon recovered emotional distress damages from
a negligent defendant who ran a traction company car into the wagon even
though passenger was not physically harmed by the impact of the car into the
wagon). See also PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 54 at 330-33 (5th ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as PROSSER]. The "impact" requirement afforded a guarantee that the
mental disturbance was genuine and legitimate. PROSSER, at 331. Other jurisdic-
tions eventually decided that if the emotional damage was caused by an unreason-
able and foreseeable act by the defendant without impact, the plaintiff should also
be able to recover. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 21, at 364-65.
.2 Hill, 13 S.W. at 59. This physical injury rule was concisely stated by a Massa-
chusetts Court in Sullivan v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co., 197 Mass. 512, 516, 83 N.E.
1091, 1092 (1908): "The mental suffering, for which damages can be recovered,
therefore, are limited to those which result to the person injured as the necessary
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for damages resulting from her miscarriage that occurred
after she witnessed her landlord's boisterous and violent
assault of two men. 3 The Texas Supreme Court upheld
plaintiff's cause of action despite the absence of impact
because the plaintiff's miscarriage was a "physical injury"
caused by the landlord's shouting. To prevent
fabricated claims the court stated that no action would ex-
ist when only fright occurred without resulting physical
injury.3 5
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed Hill in Gulf, Colorado
& Santa Fe Railway v. Hayter.36 The court allowed recovery
for a plaintiff who suffered mental shock produced by
fright when the train on which he was a passenger collided
with another train. The court stated that recovery did
not require "impact," but added that physical injuries
must result from the mental shock.3 8 The court also con-
cluded that an injured party is entitled to recover only if
the traditional negligence elements are present; "the
act. . . is the proximate cause of the injury, [which] . . .
ought. . to have been forseen as a natural and probable
consequence threreof.' '39 By relying on negligence prin-
ciples, the court refuted the criticism that allowing recov-
ery causes multiple damage suits and intolerable
litigation."' The court concluded that physical injury can
be a natural consequence of a mental emotion and that
or natural consequence of the physical injury. But sentiments of grief, sorrow,
and mourning, which are aroused by extraneous causes, thoughts, or reflections
are excluded."
s Hill, 13 S.W. at 59.
14 Id. The court relied on the fact that defendant knew of the plaintiff's presence
and condition. Id.
3,5 Id. Physical injury was necessary for recovery. The court recognized that "a
physical personal injury may be produced through a strong emotion of the mind."
Id.
93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944 (1900).
Id. Although the court did not explicitly rely on it, it must be noted that he
was a "direct" plaintiff. In other words, the negligence is said to be directed at
him. See Note, Texas Bystander Recover,: In the Aftermath of Sanchez v. Schindler, 35
BAYLOR L. REV. 883, 884 n.21 (1983).
38 Gulf, 54 S.W. at 945. Plaintiff suffered "traumatic neurasthenia." Id. at 944.
31 Id. at 945.
40 Id.
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such injuries can be anticipated."
In an attempt to achieve a more objective standard for
recognizing claims of negligent infliction of emotional
distress and still limit recovery, some courts have replaced
the impact and injury rules with the zone of danger rule.42
Under this rule, a bystander who reasonably fears for his
own safety while witnessing the injuries of a third party
may recover damages for mental anguish if he is in a posi-
tion of potential bodily injury because of the defendant's
negligence.43 In Houston Electric Co. v. Dorsett,44 the Texas
Supreme Court held that plaintiff's lawsuit had been im-
41 Id. The court stated "in the light of modern science - nay, in the light of
common knowledge - can a court say. . . that a strong mental emotion may not
produce in the subject bodily or mental injury?" Id.
Early Texas courts recognized two exceptions to the principle that a plaintiff
must be physically injured at the time of mental distress in order to recover for
damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See PROSSER, supra note
22, at 329. The first exception involves negligent transmission of a message by
telegraph companies. See, e.g., Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580
(1885) (failure to deliver message of declining health of brother); Relle v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex 308 (1881) (failure to deliver within reasonable time a
message of mother's death). The second exception involves mishandling of
corpses. See, e.g., Missouri, Ky. & Tenn. Ry. Co. v. Hawkins, 109 S.W. 221 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1908, writ refd) (defendant railroad negligently and roughly mishan-
dled box of two month old corpse while in vicinity of parents); Hale v. Bonner, 82
Tex. 33, 17 S.W. 605 (1891) (railroad failed to promptly deliver the body of de-
ceased husband). These special circumstances insure that claims are not feigned.
The obvious likelihood of genuine and serious mental anguish arising in these
situations allows Texas courts to award damages without a showing of physical
injury. See, e.g., Relle v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308 (1881) (failure to
deliver within reasonable time a message of mother's death).
42 See, e.g., Whetham v. Bismark Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972) (mother
denied recovery for severe mental and emotional injury when hospital employee
dropped her newborn infant on floor because mother was not within zone of dan-
ger); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.W.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969) (mother, who heard screech of automobile brakes and saw injured child,
was denied recovery because she was not within the zone of danger herself);
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963), overruled, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72 (1968) (applying zone of danger rule to preclude a mother's claim for
emotional distress suffered as a result of witnessing her child being crushed to
death).
43 Note, Damages For Mental Anguish Over the Injuries of a Third Person, 50 J. AIR L.
& Com. 351, 363 (1985) [hereinater cited as Note]. See also Zaret, Negligent Inflic-
lion of Emotional Distress: Reconciling the Bystander and Direct Victim Causes of Action, 18
U.S.F.L. REV. 145, 149 (1983).
44 145 Tex. 95, 194 S.W.2d 546 (1946).
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properly dismissed by the trial court and that the petition
did state a cause of action 45 Plaintiff claimed that she suf-
fered extreme nervousness, severe headaches, lapse of
memory, and brain deterioration resulting from the negli-
gent operation of a bus driven by the defendant's em-
ployee.46 The bus narrowly missed striking the plaintiff
but it did not come into contact with her body. The de-
fendant excepted to the plaintiff's claims in her petition
because the plaintiff was not hit by the bus, the damages
were too remote and speculative, the negligence was not
the proximate cause of the damage and the claim rested
solely upon the grounds of fright and shock.4 7 Because
the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court, it
failed to expressly adopt the zone of danger rule. None-
theless, the supreme court did recognize that the plaintiff
met the requirements for applying the zone of danger rule
in this case.
Even though the Texas Supreme Court failed to ex-
pressly adopt the zone of danger rule in Houston Electric, a
lower court chose to adopt the rule. In H.E. Butt Grocery
Co. v. Perez,48 an elephant escaped from the defendant's
grocery store parking lot.49 The plaintiff's mother, hear-
ing the screams next door and thinking her children were
in trouble, ran outside where the elephant charged past
her.5" The San Antonio Court of Appeals stated that
plaintiff was not only concerned for her children, but, be-
cause the elephant passed in close proximity to her, she
was also placed in apprehension of suffering injury her-
self.5 ' Additionally, the court stated that the plaintiff's re-
sulting miscarriage from the fright was reasonably
foreseeable because of defendant's negligence in not se-
4. Id. at 548.
4; Id. at 546.
47 Id. at 547.
48 408 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, no writ).
41, Id. at 578.
.- Id. at 581.
.51 Id.
curing the elephant.52 Consequently, plaintiff was in the
zone of danger, and her fear produced a physical injury. 5
Awarding damages to witnesses of an event that injures
or kills another person has troubled Texas courts because
the plaintiff's injury is often unforeseeable by the defend-
ant. 54 The Texas Supreme Court attempted to alleviate
this problem in Kaufman v. Miller.55 In Kaufman, the plain-
tiff was in a minor car accident with defendant and was
afraid that the defendant or her passengers were injured.
The plaintiff was later diagnosed as experiencing a "con-
version reaction" which was triggered by the accident.5 6
The court again recognized the zone of danger theory but
applied a negligence analysis. The court held that where
the defendant cannot reasonably anticipate any harm, she
owes no duty to the plaintiff.57 The court denied this
plaintiff recovery because he suffered mental shock due to
an injury or threatened injury to a third person (the de-
fendant). Plaintiff failed to show fear of his own safety as
required by the zone of danger rule8.5  The court then
considered the two elements of proximate cause required
to prove negligence, cause in fact and foreseeability.59
The court stated that "but for" the accident, the plaintiff
would not have been injured. Therefore, cause in fact was
established. However, the court denied recovery since
52 Id.
53 Id.
Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm to Bystanders-Should Recoveiy be
Denied?, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 561, (1975).
55 414 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1967). The court noted, liability of a defendant to all
bystanders shocked by an accident and to relatives and friends upset by the acci-
dent is unjustified. Id. at 169 (citing PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 353-54 (3rd ed.
1964)):
It would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all human activity if
the defendant who has endangered one man were to be compelled
to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person disturbed by
reason of it, including every bystander shocked at an accident, and
every distant relative of the person injured, as well as his friends.
Kaufman, 414 S.W.2d at 166.
57 Id. at 167-70.
- Id. at 170.
.- Id. at 168.
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the plaintiff's neurosis was unforeseeable.6 °
2. Dillon v. Legg
The recovery limitations for negligent infliction of
mental distress6' remained in effect in Texas and other
states until the California Supreme Court decided Dillon v.
Legg in 1968.62 In Dillon, the court abandoned the zone of
danger rule previously applied by California courts in
mental injury cases.6" Erin Dillon, the infant daughter of
Mrs. Margery Dillon, was struck and killed by a negli-
gently driven automobile.64 Mrs. Dillon and her other
daughter witnessed the tragic accident. 65 They filed
causes of action alleging that the defendant driver's negli-
gence caused "great emotional disturbance and shock
and injury to [the] nervous system . . . [as well as] great
physical and mental pain and suffering."'6 6 The trial court
allowed recovery for the decedent's sister only because
she was in the zone of danger while Mrs. Dillon was not.6 7
Noting the awkward result, the California Supreme Court
abandoned the zone of danger rule.68 In its place the
court adopted a "pure" negligence approach based on
foreseeability, and reversed the trial court as to Mrs. Dil-
6o Id. at 171. The court held that mere susceptibility to mental anguish was not
a basis for establishing foreseeability. Id. Recovery was also precluded because the
plaintiffs mental anguish did not accrue for some time after the accident. Id. at
170.
61 See supra notes 21-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of these limita-
tions including the zone of danger rule and the impact rule.
62 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
63 See Arnaya, 379 P.2d at 513.
- Dillon, 441 P.2d at 914.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 915.
68 Id. The court stated, "we can hardly justify relief to the sister for trauma
which she suffered upon apprehension of the child's death and yet deny it to the
mother merely because of a happenstance that the sister was some few yards
closer to the accident." Id. Additionally, the court recognized the artificiality of
the zone of danger rule and stated that it has already rejected the impact rule.
The court stated, "[t]he zone-of-danger concept must, then, inevitably collapse
because the only reason for the requirement of presence in that zone lies in the
fact that one within it will fear the danger of impact." Id.
Ion's claim.6"' The court established a three part test for
determining the foreseeability of a bystander's injury: 1)
the plaintiff must be located near the scene of the acci-
dent, as contrasted with one who is at a distance away
from it; 2) there must be a direct emotional impact upon
plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous obser-
vance of the accident as contrasted with learning of the
accident from others after its occurrence; 3) the plaintiff
and victim must be closely related, as contrasted with an
absence of any relationship or the presence of only a dis-
tant relationship. 70  This decision by the California
Supreme Court was the first attempt to provide guidelines
for foreseeability in negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress cases. Other states have adopted or modified the
Dillon test as an analytical framework for emotional dis-
tress claims.7'
3. The Aftermath of Dillon v. Legg
Texas courts resisted adoption of the Dillon rationale
even when the ideal fact situation for application of the
Dillon principle was presented to the Houston Court of
Appeals in 1974. In Dave Snelling Lincoln-Mercury v. Si-
mon,7 2 the plaintiff and her son were passengers in a car
when, because of a defective door latch, plaintiff wit-
nessed her son fall out of the car and on to the highway.
After he had fallen out of the vehicle, another car struck
him.73 The court allowed recovery based on the princi-
ples of foreseeability.7 ' The court concluded that the de-
c.9 Id. at 916-25.
70 Id. at 920. It is important to note that Mrs. Dillon suffered consequent bodily
illness as a result of the shock. Id. Proving bodily injury was the rule in California
until Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980); see infra note 89 for discussion of the court's decision in Molien.
71 See, e.g., Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983); Paugh v.
Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983); Culbert v. Sampson's
Supermkts., Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Entex, Inc. v. McGuire, 414 So. 2d
437 (Miss. 1982); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981).
72 508 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1974, no writ).
7. Id. at 924.
74 Id. at 926.
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fendant could have reasonably foreseen that by not
properly fixing the car door lock, a small child or anyone
might be injured if the lock should malfunction resulting
in foreseeable emotional distress.75 Although the Califor-
nia decision of Dillon had been decided by the time of this
case, the court did not need to rely on it, because the
same result could be reached using the zone of danger
rule. 76 The Houston Court of Civil Appeals observed that
some Texas state courts of appeals had recognized the
zone of danger rule, but that the Texas Supreme Court
had not.77 The court of appeals applied negligence prin-
ciples instead of the zone of danger rule to analyze the
case. The court stated, however, that although they did
not apply the zone of danger rule, its conditions were still
met.78 In dicta, the court artificially stretched the mean-
ing of the zone of danger to allow recovery when plaintiff
did not fear for her own safety, as the rule prescribes, but
feared only for the safety of her son.79
The previously cited cases exemplify the courts' hap-
hazard approach to bystanders' claims for mental anguish.
The artificial distinctions used by Texas courts have pre-
vented a systematic method of recovery for these plain-
tiffs. In 1978, however, the Texarkana Court of Civil
Appeals in Landreth v. Reed8 ° ignored the past limitations
of the zone of danger rule and determined that a by-
stander's recovery for mental anguish should be deter-
mined solely upon principles of negligence and proximate
cause based upon reasonable foreseeability.8' In so do-
ing, the court adopted the factors set forth in Dillon.82
In Landreth, fourteen month old Kecia Reed fell into a
75 Id.
76 Id. at 925-26.
77 Id. at 925.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 926.
go 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
" Id. at 489.
82 Id. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Dillon
opinion and the factors enunciated as the basis for the opinion.
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swimming pool at a day care center. Her sister, Melissa
Reed, witnessed unsuccessful efforts to resuscitate
Kecia.83 The defendant, the owner of the day care center,
challenged the mental anguish claim on the basis that Me-
lissa Reed was not in the zone of danger and did not suf-
fer an impact.84 The court, however, chose to "disregard
the artificial distinctions" created by these rules and in-
stead based its decision on the foreseeability of Melissa
Reed's injuries as applied in the traditional concept de-
scribed in Dillon.8" First, the court concluded that Melissa
must have been close to the scene of the accident since
the day care center was a relatively small area and Melissa
was near the pool. Second, although she may not have
been in the pool with Kecia, Melissa received direct emo-
tional impact from sensory and contemporaneous obser-
vance of the drowning because she saw unsuccessful
attempts to revive Kecia.86 The third Dillon factor, a close
relationship between plaintiff and victim, was also satis-
fied since Kecia and Melissa were sisters.8 7 Consequently,
with all three Dillon factors being satisfied, the court found
defendant negligent and allowed Melissa to recover for
physical injuries resulting from the mental anguish she
sustained.88
Even after the adoption of Dillon by the court of appeals
decision in Landreth, several uncertainties remain concern-
ing the scope and applicability of the Dillon factors. The
most important uncertainty today is whether the Texas
Supreme Court will allow recovery for negligent infliction
of emotional distress without proving some physical mani-
festation resulting from the emotional harm.89 The un-
s3 Landreth, 570 S.W.2d at 488.
- Id. at 489.
o5 Id.
so Id. at 489-90. The court stated that "actual observance of the accident is not
required if there is otherwise an experiential perception of it, as distinguished
from learning of it from others after its occurrence." Id. at 490.
87 Such sibling relationships generally are considered sufficiently close for by-
stander recovery purposes. See id. at 490.
88 Id. at 489-90.
81 In Bedgood v. Madalin, 600 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1980), the Texas
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certainty is caused by the court's decision in Sanchez v.
Schindler.90 The plaintiff mother in Sanchez observed her
son's bloody legs through the hospital door after he was
in a motorcycle accident.9' The court allowed recovery in
the wrongful death action for mental anguish, overruling
prior law that a parent could recover only for the pecuni-
ary loss of a child.92 Mrs. Sanchez also suffered traumatic
depressive neurosis, frequent neck and shoulder pains
and headaches as a consequence of her emotional dis-
tress.93 Because Mrs. Sanchez suffered physical ailments
as a result of the emotional harm, the Texas Supreme
Court did not address the issue of whether she could
recover damages without proof of the physical
manifestation.
Supreme Court avoided discussion of a potential physical manifestation issue by
concluding that plaintiffs failed to plead their emotional distress claim properly at
trial. The court of appeals had upheld a jury award for mental anguish after find-
ing, in effect, an adequate trial amendment to the pleadings. Id. See Bedgood v.
Madalin, 589 S.W.2d 797, 801-02 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979), afd in
part, revd in part, 600 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1980). In Bedgood, plaintiff-father heard
defendant's vehicle, then a scream from his son and a "thud like a watermelon
being dropped from a great height." Id. at 802. The father rushed to his front
yard to find his son lying on the curb bleeding. Id. The court of appeals denied
mental anguish recovery to plaintiff-mother who had been out shopping at the
time of the accident; but allowed mental anguish recovery to the father. Id. at 803.
The only evidence of physical injury to father was that he suffered incapacitating
depression following the accident. Id. The court of appeals did not elaborate on
whether the father's mental anguish claim might have succeeded absent the evi-
dence of depression.
For a discussion of a California case in which a court allowed recovery for
mental anguish without physical manifestation, see Molien v. Kaiser Found.
Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rprt. 831 (1980) (applying Dillon
factors and allowing plaintiff to recover for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, even without proof of physical illness, where defendants incorrectly diag-
nosed plaintiffs wife as having syphillus).
- 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
9' Id. at 250.
" Id. at 251. Traditionally, the recovery for pecuniary loss of a child was mini-
mal so the court rejected the limitation. Id. Although this cause of action is for
wrongful death rather than negligent infliction of emotional distress, the re-
quested damages for mental anguish are the same. However, since plaintiff was
capable of bringing the wrongful death claim instead of an independent tort claim
for mental anguish, she did so in order to maximize her potential damage
recovery.
' Id. at 253.
Subsequent analyses of Sanchez by several Texas Court
of Appeals decisions create a split in the courts as to
whether the Texas Supreme Court will require manifesta-
tions of physical injury. The Dallas Court of Appeals in
Air Florida, Inc. v. Zondler94 held that in a simple negligence
case, "proof of accompanying physical injury is a neces-
sary predicate to recover damages for mental anguish." 95
Zondler's wife brought a wrongful death action against
Air Florida after its jetliner crashed in Washington D.C.
killing 78 passengers, including Zondler.96 The Dallas
court first determined that Sanchez did not restrict the re-
covery of nonpecuniary loss in a wrongful death action for
minor decedents.97 The court concluded that Sanchez cre-
ated the possibility of recovery of mental anguish dam-
ages as a result of the death of a spouse.98 The court,
however, then considered whether Sanchez required proof
of accompanying physical injury to recover damages for
mental anguish. Noting that decisions prior to Sanchez re-
quired physical injury, the court of appeals could find
nothing in the majority's opinion in Sanchez to indicate a
change from former decisions.99 The court consequently
did not allow recovery for Mrs. Zondler's mental anguish
because of her inadequate showing of physical injury.100
To the contrary, the Beaumont Court of Appeals in
Baptist Hospital of Southwest Texas, Inc. v. Baber'° ' allowed
recovery for mental or emotional trauma despite the lack
of depression or secondary reactions manifested physi-
cally.10 2 In Baber, decedent's wife filed a medical malprac-
- 683 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
I Id. at 773.
Id. at 770. Because the Zondlers were Texas residents, Mrs. Zondler filed the
lawsuit in Dallas. Air Florida admitted liability, so the parties tried the case solely
on the issue of damages. Id.




672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, writ granted). As of the writ-
ing of this Comment the Texas Supreme Court has not decided this case.
o2 Id. at 298-99.
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tice action asserting that defendants' conduct resulted in
Mr. Baber's death.'" 3 The plaintiff sought damages for
mental injuries as a result of the death.0 4 The court
stated without elaboration that Sanchez authorizes the re-
covery for mental injuries absent physical manifesta-
tion.' 0 5 The Houston Court of Appeals in Missouri Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Vlach 106 also held damages for mental
anguish are recoverable without proof of physical mani-
festations. l0 7 In Vlach, the wife and children of decedent
filed a wrongful death action requesting damages for
mental anguish. 0 8 The court of appeals upheld the trial
court's award of mental anguish damages, stating that
Sanchez abrogated the requirement of accompanying phys-
ical injury to mental anguish.' 0 9
Another question facing the Texas Supreme Court
since the lower court's adoption of the Dillon factors is the
"contemporaneous perception" scenario and whether re-
covery is allowed in an action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress if the bystander is not present at the
exact time the injury occurs. In General Motors Corp. v. Griz-
zle, I10 the plaintiff arrived on the scene a few minutes after
a car and truck collision involving her daughter.' Plain-
tiff fainted at the sight of the wreckage and awoke hearing
her daughter's screams." 2 The daughter was then taken
to the hospital where plaintiff waited during the surgery.
to. Id. at 297.
104 Id.
to-, Id. at 299. Whether physical manifestations are required for proof of mental
anguish was not expressly stated by the majority in Sanchez. However, the dissent
in Sanchez stated that the court's holding was an indirect mandate "that any mental
anguish however slight, is compensable." Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 258 (Pope, C.J.,
dissenting).
1 11 687 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
107 Id. at 417.
log Id. at 416.
lo.. Id. at 417.
- 642 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, writ dism'd).
, Id. at 844.
12 Id. at 843.
Citing Landreth and Bedgood v. Madalin," 13 the Waco Court
of Appeals allowed the plaintiff to recover for her mental
anguish, even though she neither witnessed nor sensorily
perceived the actual occurrence of the accident."14 The
court noted that "the triggering of the mental anguish is
not from only perceiving a collision, but from the realiza-
tion of its consequences." '"t 5 Grizzle demonstrates the
possible ramifications of extending the Dillon requirement
that a plaintiff receive a direct emotional impact from sen-
sory and contemporaneous perception. Grizzle raises the
question of how much time can pass before the plaintiff
sees the victim, and still recover for contemporaneous
perception. Will this factor be extended to the point that
one can recover after merely hearing of the accident from
someone else? Probably not. The court in Dillon specifi-
cally excluded that possibility, and the Texas Supreme
Court has given no indication in its prior decisions that it
would extend a plaintiff's recovery this far.' 1 6
In a recently reported decision, the Austin Court of Ap-
peals allowed recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress despite the lack of contemporaneous
perception of the injury. In City of Austin v. Davis," 7 the
plaintiff's son was hospitalized after a motor vehicle acci-
dent. 1 8 Because of the son's disorientation and confu-
sion, the doctors ordered him to be physically restrained
or medicated." 9 The plaintiff, Davis, visited his son regu-
larly but on his arrival at the hospital one day, his son was
not in the room. 120 While searching with hospital secur-
ity, Davis found his son's body at the base of a ten-story
airshaft. 2 ' The son had entered the shaft and fallen to his
"3 589 S.W.2d at 797. See supra note 89 for a discussion of the court's decision
in Bedgood.
11 Grizzle, 642 S.W.2d at 844.
' 5 Id.
,- See Landreth, 570 S.W.2d at 489.
117 693 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
I1 ld. at 32.
1lis Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 33.
1986] COMMENT 1053
1054 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
death. 22 Davis disclaimed interest in the wrongful death
action and won a judgment in the trial court for his own
suit for the mental distress and physical injuries he sus-
tained as a bystander to the incident. 23 Relying on Lan-
dreth's factors in determining proximate cause, the court
of appeals held that although Davis was not present at the
time his son fell to his death and, therefore, did not expe-
rience a contemporaneous perception, he could still re-
cover.' 24 The court, citing Grizzle, stated that Davis "was
brought so close to the reality of the accident as to render
[his] experience an integral part of it," and that Davis ex-
perienced sufficient perception to satisfy the requirements
of the bystander doctrine. 125
Only recently, the Texas Courts of Appeals developed
the law for a bystander's independent action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. The Texas Supreme
Court has not confronted this issue in a case where this
action is the sole action. Therefore, some question exists
as to how the supreme court would decide these issues.
The supreme court would most likely use the Dillon fac-
tors as adopted in Landreth as well as its own additional
factors espoused in Kaufman and permit recovery for
mental anguish when the plaintiff satisfies these require-
ments. The supreme court will also probably require that
there be only some contemporaneous perception by the
plaintiff of the accident allowing plaintiff to recover on
discovering the body without prior knowledge of the acci-
122 Id.
'2- Id. This case also shows the distinction between bringing a wrongful death
action and a separate cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Id. at 34. The claim for mental anguish damages is only one of the claims of a
cause of action under the wrongful death statute.
,24 Id. at 33-44.
'25 Id. The court also described the independent tort for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at 33. The court stated that Davis, who satisfied the re-
quirements of the bystander doctrine, may bring his own suit and not join other
wrongful death beneficiaries. Id. at 34. The court stated "It]his bystander suit is
not derivative of the statutory wrongful death action." Id. Even before Sanchez, a
parent present at the accident could recover for his own emotional injuries even
though they would not have been able to recover in a wrongful death action. Id.
(citing Bedgood, 589 S.W.2d at 797).
dent. 126 Despite some lower court interpretations of
Sanchez, the court will probably not require a showing of
physical manifestations, recognizing the absurdity in the
requirement as expressed by Justice Guillot's dissent in
Zondler.127 Justice Guillot descriptively stated that had
Mrs. Zondler fallen to her knees, bruising them, when
hearing of her husband's death then she could recover
fully for her mental anguish. However, since she did not
suffer such a physical "injury," she was unable to recover.
B. Application of Bystander Rules in Aircrash Cases
The principles governing recovery for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress must be applied to the special
circumstances arising in airplane crash litigation in juris-
dictions other than Texas. Texas courts are most likely to
look to other states for guidance because of the lack of
Texas cases involving commercial air crashes. This sec-
tion will discuss some unique characteristics of aviation
crashes that make them different from other situations, in-
cluding the fact that commercial airplane crashes involve
an extreme amount of publicity. In addition, family mem-
bers are often uncertain whether their loved ones are on
the flight. The injuries resulting from air crashes are es-
pecially severe because of the frequency of burns and dis-
memberments. In addition, plane crashes usually
generate complex litigation because of the many deaths
that are usually involved.
Airplane crash litigation presents unique questions of
liability for negligently inflicted emotional distress.
Courts considering claims for emotional distress arising
from air crashes generally apply a restrictive foreseeability
test.'2 8 The concern for unlimited liability for the multi-
tude of injuries that could fall within reasonable foresee-
ability is prevalent throughout these cases. First, airplane
crash litigation is unique because there is the uncertainty
126 See Landreth, 570 S.W.2d at 490.
,27 Zondler, 683 S.W.2d at 776 (Guillot, J., dissenting).
I. See infra notes 137-162 and accompanying text.
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arising after the crash regarding exactly who was on the
flight. Initially, records are incomplete because there are
passengers who boarded the flight at the last minute.
Therefore, when the plane crashes, officials need time to
gather information in order to announce a complete and
accurate list of passengers. The case of Wood v. United Air
Lines, Inc. 129 presented the question of airline liability
when inaccurate information about the manifest list was
given to families of those on board. 30  Wood arose from
the 1965 United Airlines accident in which 43 of the 85
passengers died when the plane crashed while landing in
Salt Lake City, Utah.' 31 The plaintiffs, heirs of passenger
Betty Wood, brought suit claiming damages for the emo-
tional distress sustained when a United Airlines' represen-
tative told them that Mrs. Wood was not on the plane,
when in fact she was.' 32 Plaintiffs claimed that these state-
ments were a direct cause of their emotional distress. 3 3
Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recog-
nized that claims for mental anguish are sometimes recov-
erable, the court stated that "damages for [any] mental
pain and suffering, where there has been no physical in-
jury, are allowed only in extreme cases."' 3 4 In reviewing
Utah law, the court concluded that a plaintiff can not re-
ceive this type of recovery when there is only a negligent
-- 404 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1968).
,so Id. at 163-64. The manifest list is the airline's list of passengers who have
supposedly checked in and are on the flight.
-' Id. at 163.
1.2 Id. at 163-64. The plaintiffs recovered substantially under the wrongful
death claims asserted. Id. at 163. However, the questions considered by the ap-
pellate court concerned claims asserted against defendant with respect to acts oc-
curring subsequent to the accident and death of Mrs. Wood. Id. The flight
manifest list did not include Mrs. Wood's name and United representative delib-
erately maintained to the plaintiffs that Mrs. Wood was not on board and there-
fore not injured. Id. at 163, 166. Plaintiffs also claim emotional distress because of
the delay in time it took defendant to identify the body and turn it over to plain-
tiffs. Id. at 164. The court held that United Air Lines acted within its authority
and had permission from the Civil Aeronautics Board for all of its actions. Id. at
165.
,.- Id. at 164.
134 Id. at 165 (citing United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 925 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 899 (1958)).
infliction of emotional distress by defendant. 135 The
court stated that this recovery will be allowed when there
is an intentional act by defendant or when defendant's con-
duct is grossly outrageous. 136
Plane crashes also cause widespread immediate public-
ity. Often, family members of those on the flight hear of
the crash and probable death of their loved ones through
the media before being officially notified. After hearing
through a third party source (television, radio or another
person) that a family member died as a result of an air-
crash, these family member plaintiffs attempt to recover
damages for infliction of emotional distress. In Saxton v.
McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Co. ,37 the plaintiff claimed that
publicity was a cause of the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress and consequently a cause of suicide. The
publicity concerned an aircrash that occurred near Paris,
France, on March 3, 1974, when a Turkish Airlines DC-10
crashed killing 346 persons. The case involved a damage
claim for the mental injuries suffered by Betty Kween, the
mother of a deceased passenger. Mrs. Kween allegedly
suffered "shock, depression, melancholia and uncontrol-
lable and irresistable [sic] urge to take her life" as a result
of the tremendous publicity that followed the crash. 13 8
Approximately two years after the crash, Betty Kween
committed suicide. 139
The personal representatives of Betty Kween's estate
claimed Mrs. Kween's death was foreseeable by the de-
fendants, the manufacturers of the plane.140 The Federal
District Court for the Central District of California, apply-
ing California law, noted the foreseeability requirements
1 Wood, 404 F.2d at 165.
13, Id. In dicta, the court stated "a reckless error made conversely, that Mrs.
Wood was on board when she was not, might well have been actionable" (empha-
sis by court). Id. at 166.
137 428 F. Supp. 1047 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
138 Id. at 1049.
1m, Id. at 1048.
140 Id. at 1049. The plaintiffs claimed that "her death was foreseeable and
within the risk of harm and 'zone of physical, emotional and psychological im-
pact.'" Id.
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set forth in Dillon.'4' The court held that application of the
foreseeabilty requirements excluded recovery on these
facts as "remote and unexpected." The court based this
decision largely on the policy against burdensome and un-
limited liability.' 4 2 The court was additionally concerned
that all manufacturers of even a single part of an airplane
would have to "foresee that every single person through-
out the world who flew on an airplane might have a rela-
tive of unstable mental capacity."' 43
Two other cases have denied recovery for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress. These cases are based on
unforeseeability because knowledge of the crash came
from a third party source. In Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp.,44 plaintiff Manuel Cohen's claim arose as a result
of an American Airlines crash near Chicago, Illinois, on
May 25, 1979.' 45 The plaintiff learned about the crash
while listening to the radio. After discovering that his
brother, Ira, died on the flight, he called their mother,
Nellie Cohen.' 46 Mrs. Cohen shortly thereafter suffered
painful heart attacks and died two days later. Plaintiff
claimed that American Airlines and the manufacturer of
the plane were primarily liable for Nellie Cohen's mental
distress and resulting death. 4 7 Relying on the foresee-
ability requirements established in Dillon, the court denied
recovery because Mrs. Cohen's injury did not result from
a sensory perception of the injuries caused to her son or
from the injury producing event. 48 The court concluded
that because these requirements were not met, liability
could not be imposed under the doctrine of negligent in-
141 Id. at 1050. Citing Dillon the court stated, "the indispensable element of duty
in third-party shock [or suicide] cases is the degree of foreseeability . . . . The
courts thus mark out the areas of liability, excluding the remote and unexpected."
ld.
I142 Id. at 1053. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 21, at 360-61.
14,4 Id.
144 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E.2d 581 (1983).
14. Id. at 583.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 589.
14K Id. at 590.
fliction of emotional distress. 149  In Saunders v. Air Florida,
Inc., 1  Mr. Saunders brought suit claiming that he wit-
nessed injuries sustained by his son, Michael Saunders, as
shown in a television report of the January 13, 1982, Air
Florida crash in Washington D.C.1 5' Michael Saunders
was driving on the bridge when the airplane struck the
bridge injuring many motorists including Saunders. The
District of Columbia Court considered the case under
both District of Columbia and California laws. The court
first held that "there is no cause of action in the District of
Columbia for negligent infliction of emotional shock oc-
curring as the result of watching another's injury, even if
such grief ultimately manifests itself physically in the
plaintiff."15 2 Thus, the court interpreted District of Co-
lumbia law as permitting no recovery for a bystander not
directly injured in the accident. The court then looked at
this cause of action under California law and applied the
Dillon factors for foreseeability.153 The court concluded
that by watching filmings of the crash, the father probably
only saw filming of the aftermath of the crash. However,
if it was a contemporaneous filming it was highly unlikely
that he could discern his son's car. 154 He was therefore
only a "passive spectator" and could not recover because
there was no perception of the injury or shock contempo-
raneous with the injury. 155 The court concluded that the
harms alleged by plaintiff were "not reasonably foresee-
149 Id. at 588.
- 558 F. Supp. 1233 (D.D.C. 1983).
151 Id. at 1234. Plaintiff brought suit under the D.C. Wrongful Death Statute as
well as this second claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. Plaintiff
saw reports of the crash on television. Plaintiff alleges that after seeing the air-
plane strike his son's car on the bridge he sustained, "great emotional distur-
bance, shock, and injury to his nervous system which has caused, continued to
cause, and will cause him great physical and mental pain." Id. at 1235.
152 Id. at 1236. The court additionally stated that "where a cause of action for
emotional distress has been allowed in the District of Columbia, it is the emo-
tional distress which arises from the physical injury-causing impact, rather than
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able to Air Florida and much too remote and unexpected
to be actionable." 5
6
Another unusual foreseeablity case arose in which the
plaintiff did not actually see the accident. The claim re-
sulted from a crash between two Boeing 747's in the Ca-
nary Islands on March 27, 1977.157 Martha Burke, the
twin sister of a crash victim, filed suit for her own physical
and emotional injuries allegedly sustained while in her
home in California and engaged in "extrasensory empa-
thy" at the exact time of her twin's death.' 58 She alleged
that at the time that she experienced this "extrasensory
empathy," she knew that her sister had died. 5
9
The District Court for the Southern District of New
York, applying California law, assessed Burke's claim in
light of Dillon's foreseeability factors. 16 ° The court con-
cluded that although there was a close relationship be-
tween Martha Burke and her twin, Martha Burke was not
located near the accident-scene, nor did she suffer from a
contemporaneous sensory observance of the accident.'
6 1
The court concluded that Burke's allegations were not
sensory, but "extrasensory perception" and outside the
realm of foreseeability. 162
Another unique set of legal issues usually associated
with plane crashes is the investigation and cleanup of the
debris and carnage. In a lawsuit resulting from the Pan
American World Airways crash in Kenner, Louisiana, on
July 9, 1982163 two law enforcement officers sued to re-
cover damages for emotional distress suffered as a result
of performing their duties at the scene of the crash and
15c, Id. at 1238.
1,' Burke v. Pan Amer. World Airways, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
'1" Id. at 851. Burke purports to have felt a painful burning sensation inside her
chest and abdomen, and "sensations of being 'split' and of emptiness 'like a black
hole' within her body." Id.
I. Id.
"~Id.
' ' Id. at 851-52.
1'1 Id. at 852.
"I., Leconte v. Pan Am. World Airways, 736 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984).
observing the injuries of the passengers." 6 The court in
Leconte v. Pan Am. World Airways did not allow recovery be-
cause Louisiana "clearly prohibits bystander recovery for
mental anguish suffered as a result of another's injury or
death." 65
In considering unique factual situations for claims of
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals did allow recovery to the plaintiffs based
on the zone of danger rule. In Quill v. Trans World Air-
ways, 1 6 6 the plaintiff brought suit claiming negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress after the plane in which he was
a passenger dove 34,000 feet in an uncontrolled tailspin
before finally landing safely. 167 Plaintiff claims that as a re-
sult of the incident he experienced adrenaline surges,
sweaty hands, elevated pulse and increased blood pres-
sure. 168 The Minnesota Court of Appeals allowed recov-
ery and held that plaintiff was in the zone of danger
providing "an indicia of genuineness" for his physical
injuries. 169
These cases demonstrate various ways in which claims
for negligent infliction of emotional distress have been
brought. In most cases, if the jurisdiction allows recovery
for a bystander due to someone else's injury, the plaintiff
will probably recover if he is in the zone of danger. If the
jurisdiction has adopted Dillon, however, the plaintiff's re-
covery is more uncertain because he must satisfy Dillon's
three requirements to establish foreseeability."'t
'- Id. at 1020. These men contend they suffered "severe nausea, vomiting, in-
somnia, nightmares, nervousness and anxiety." Id.
165 Id. at 1021. See Note, supra note 43, at 371 for a discussion of the applica-
ble Louisiana law.
1- 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
167 id. at 440. The plane was cruising at an altitude of 39,000 feet when it rolled
over and plunged downward. Id. Its tailspin continued for the next 40 seconds at
speeds around "the speed of sound," causing the plane to shake violently. Id.
t-8 Id. at 441. The plaintiff did not consult any medical professionals because
he himself was a doctor, and he knew they could not help him. Id.
1 6 Id. at 443-44.
170 This still supposes that the factors of Dillon are met so that the emotional
distress was a foreseeable result of the negligence by defendant.
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II. PAIN AND SUFFERING ACTUAL DAMAGES
PRE-IMPACT FEAR
The previous section dealt with the first situation in
which mental anguish damages are generally permitted.
These are for the independent tort of negligent infliction
of emotional distress. As shown, this recovery is for by-
standers who suffer emotional distress as a result of see-
ing a relative either injured or killed because of the
defendant's negligence. This section will deal with the
second category in which recovery for mental anguish is
permitted. Damages for mental anguish in this instance
are recoverable when the emotional injury is the proxi-
mate result of physical injury or pain of someone who is a
direct victim. 7 ' Because of the confusion that ordinarily
arises as a result of the similarity between these two areas
of recovery for emotional distress, it is necessary to clarify
the differences and the situations in which they overlap.
Pain and suffering damages may be awarded only to a
person who is directly injured. The award may be made
for the pain he suffered prior to judgment, and for that
pain likely to be suffered in the future. 72 Although pain
and suffering is an inseparable element of the overall
damage claim, it actually consists of three categories.
7 3
The first and second categories are physical pain and the
mental suffering which arises from the discomfort and in-
convenience of physical pain. 74 The third category is
mental anguish, which includes unpleasant mental conse-
quences, such as fright and apprehension that attend
physical injury. This third category also includes humilia-
tion and embarassment resulting from an injury that in-
171 See infra notes 172-206 and accompanying text.
172 See Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Paschall, 92 S.W. 446, 448 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1906, writ refd)
1" 1 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTION (MB) § 4.10 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
DAMAGES].
174 Kingham Messenger & Delivery Serv. v. Daniels, 435 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ).
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volves any disfigurement. 175 Because separate categories
of pain and suffering exist, suffering can continue after
the pain subsides. In fact, to recover for pain and suffer-
ing, especially in the future, physical pain is not necessary
and emotional suffering alone is compensable. 176  Pain
and suffering damages are unliquidated and indetermi-
nate and, therefore, left to the discretion of the trier of
fact. 177 Because of the speculation involved in determin-
ing the value of damages for pain and suffering, some
question exists whether these damages truly serve their
purpose of compensating the plaintiff. Despite this specu-
lation, most states, including Texas, generally accept
these damages for pain and suffering.17 8
Damages for pain and suffering are generally kallowed
for the time prior to judgment as well as for the time after
the trial. Several Texas cases exemplify the recovery for
175 See Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reed, 365 S.W.2d 26, 29-31 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1963, writ refd n.r.e.).
176 Fuchsberg, Damages For Pre-impact Terror, 16 TRIAL LAw. Q. 29, 31 (1984)
[herinafter cited as Fuchsberg].
'77 DAMAGES, supra note 173, at § 4.02. Unliquidated and indeterminate dam-
ages are called such because they are difficult to prove with mathematical cer-
tainty. See Newcomer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 26 Wash. App. 958, 614 P.2d 705
(Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
178 Within the second category of damages for pain and suffering the term
"mental suffering" is distinguishable from "mental anguish" and "emotional dis-
tress." Because courts often use these terms interchangeably, the terms must be
understood in order to distinguish recoveries for negligent infliction of emotional
distress and recoveries for pain and suffering. In Bruce v. Madden, 208 Va. 636,
160 S.E.2d 137 (1968), the court said that these distinctions are without a differ-
ence. Id. at 140. However, for this Comment, they will be used in different re-
spects. Practically, "mental anguish" and "emotional distress" are used in most
cases where the mental suffering is the principal injury for which recovery is
sought. "Mental suffering," however, is usually confined to cases in which mental
suffering accompanies a claim of physical injury or pain. DAMAGES, supra note 173,
at § 4.11. Therefore, "emotional distress" and "mental anguish" or "mental suf-
fering" without pain is related to the claim for the independent tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress. "Mental suffering" constitutes a part of the dam-
ages for pain and suffering awarded in a personal injury case.
Finally, there is still a question whether the Texas Supreme Court will require
plaintiffs to prove physical manifestations of the mental anguish in addition to
meeting either the Dillon test or the zone of danger test. Therefore, "emotional
distress" and "mental anguish" or "mental suffering" without pain is related to
the claim for the independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
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pain and suffering prior to judgment. 179  In Wilson v.
Yates '8  plaintiff recovered for "severe and excruciating
pain resulting in physical and mental suffering" prior to
trial as a result of being hit by an automobile.' 8 1 In Bur-
rous v. Knotts,182 the Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's ruling that the deceased had experienced con-
scious pain and suffering prior to death. The appellate
court did, however, reduce the damages awarded by the
trial court. The appellate court stated that a person can
recover only for pain consciously experienced, and that
events subsequent to unconsciousness are not compensa-
ble. t 8  The court concluded that the jury failed to distin-
guish between periods of consciousness and
unconsciousness of the deceased and therefore ordered a
remittitur. 1814
Proving damages for pain and suffering in the future is
usually more difficult than proving past pain and suffer-
ing. To prove damages for past pain and suffering, courts
require testimony by the plaintiff and the doctor. How-
ever, to support an award for pain and suffering after the
trial, the evidence must be sufficient to show with reason-
able probability that the physical pain and suffering will
persist in the future.18 5
,"9 See infra notes 180-184 and accompanying text.
,so 120 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1938, no writ) (allowing dam-
ages for pain and suffering where defendant ran over plaintiff in defendant's
automobile).
1,' Id. at 641.
,82 482 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, no writ). Decedent was killed
by a fire due to negligence of the hotel where he was staying. The jury awarded
damages for his death as well as for 10 minutes of pain and suffering. The jury
relied on the death certificate that stated this interval of time between onset of the
"acute burn and smoke inhalation" and death. Id. at 362.
,83 Id. at 363.
'4 Id. The court of appeals concluded that Knotts was not conscious for the
entire 10 minutes and would have lost consciousness sometime before death.
Therefore, the jury erred in awarding pain and suffering for the entire 10 minutes.
Id.
t85 E.g., San Antonio v. Mendoza, 532 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio, writ refd n.r.e. 1975). In Alendoza, plaintiff was operating a tractor-
mower when gasoline leaked and the machine burst into flames, severely burning
his legs. Id. at 356. The San Antonio Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
A. Texas
Recently, the courts have considered another category
of pain and suffering damages that includes the unique
pain and suffering caused by the terrifying fear that death
is imminent. 186 In most jurisdictions, this category is gen-
erally called pre-impact fear and is often associated with
plane crashes. 87 In Texas, however, the majority of these
cases have dealt with deaths resulting from accidents
other than plane crashes. The Texas Supreme Court has
applied pre-impact fear to cases brought by decedent's es-
tates but it has not used the principle in cases brought by
survivors. It is not clear whether the Texas Supreme
Court would allow recovery of damages for pre-impact
fear to survivors. However, because the proof for pain
and suffering is no longer circumstantial with a survivor, it
is reasonable to conclude that the supreme court would
allow pre-impact fear for survivors just as they have for
decedents. 188
Although it has been established in Texas that
"[c]onsciousness of approaching death is a proper ele-
ment to be considered in evaluating mental suffering,"'' 89
it is often not requested by plaintiffs' attorneys. Com-
mentators have given three reasons for the reluctance of
plaintiff's attorneys to request such damages. 9 ' The first
reason is the brevity of the period in which the person
fears that death is imminent. Often this period is only a
matter of seconds. Second, because of the brevity of the
time period, the amount of damages is limited. In cases
which involve fear for only a matter of seconds, awards
determination of damages that included $ 10,000 for future pain and suffering. Id.
at 361-62.
181 See infra notes 207-249 and accompanying text.
187 Id.
1' See Fuchsberg, supra note 176, at 35 for discussion of damage recovery for
the decedent and the survivor. Fuchsberg states, "the award for conscious pain
and suffering tends to be smaller when the victim survives: Near misses diminish
the value of conscious pain and suffering." Id. at 35.
189 Jenkins v. Hennigan, 298 S.W.2d 905, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1957, writ refd n.r.e.).
-.o See Fuchsberg, supra note 176, at 34-35.
COMMENT 106519861
1066 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
have ranged from $5,000 to $10,000.191 The third reason
involves problems of proof. When the victim dies, eyewit-
ness testimony may be difficult to obtain. The plaintiff
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
decedent had some knowledge or basis for anticipating
the impending disaster. 192 Therefore, the plaintiff must
show sufficient circumstantial evidence to allow a reason-
able inference that the victim suffered fear before impact.
Circumstantial evidence is not necessary if the victim sur-
vives since he can describe his own fear.
Few Texas cases address the issue of recovery for the
victim's fear prior to being injured or killed. In Port Termi-
nal R. R. v. Sweet 193 the widow of a railroad employee who
was killed in a railroad accident brought a wrongful death
action under the Federal Employer's Liability Act. The
Waco Court of Appeals held that the widow could recover
for the decedent's mental anguish prior to being hit and
killed by the train. 194 The court stated that "[t]he jury
could reasonably infer that Sweet [the decedent] suffered
mental anguish caused by a terrifying realization that the
train might hit him" and awarded the widow $10,000 for
her husband's conscious pain and suffering and mental
anguish. 195
In Green v. Hale,19 6 the Tyler Court of Appeals also af-
firmed a $5,000 award for mental suffering experienced
prior to death. In Green, a thirteen year old boy was killed
when he fell from the defendant's truck and the driver ac-
cidentally ran over him. 9 7 In upholding the award for
1 See, e.g., Hinson v. SS Paros, 461 F. Supp. 219, 222 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (award-
ing $5000 for a longshoreman's fear as he fell to his death from a vessel on which
he was working); Meehan v. Central R.R. Co., 181 F. Supp. 594, 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (awarding $10,000 for pre-impact terror of a train passenger during time in
which train fell from drawbridge to river below).
1..2 Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1984).
1., 640 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982), afl'd, 653 S.W.2d 291 (Tex.
1983).
-,'4 Id. at 367.
'9I Id.
590 S.W. 2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
11,7 Id. at 234.
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mental suffering, the court stated that conscious pain and
suffering can be proven by circumstantial evidence re-
gardless of how briefly the terror could have lasted. The
jury's function is to place a numerical value on that mental
suffering. 198
In addition, Texas courts have considered pre-impact
fear in a few cases involving plane crashes. In Zondler,'99
the Dallas Court of Appeals, applying Texas law, also ad-
dressed the issue of whether Zondler suffered pain or
mental anguish before his death. 20 0 A surviving passen-
ger, who knew that the plane was going to crash, testified
as to the anguish Zondler must have experienced. How-
ever, the survivor did not know Zondler, and no evidence
presented showed that Zondler knew that the plane was
going to crash.20 ' Additionally, the facts were unclear as
to whether Zondler died instantaneously in the crash or if
he suffered conscious pain before his death.20 2 Conse-
quently, the court held that Zondler's family could not re-
cover for pain and suffering prior to his death.20 3
In other plane crash litigation, the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals allowed recovery for a pilot's fear of imminent
death from the time of the in-air collision until impact
with the ground. In Hurst Aviation v. June1,2°4 a small pro-
peller plane hit another small plane from behind causing
the small plane to crash into the ground.20 5 The estate of
the small plane's pilot sued and recovered in the trial
court for the mental anguish the pilot suffered before im-
pact with the ground. The court of appeals affirmed, stat-
ing that the inferences showed that the pilot realized his
plight as he was unable to control the aircraft and proba-
"o Id. at 238.
,, See supra note 94-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Zondler
holding.
2- Zondler, 683 S.W.2d at 774.
21) Id.
202 Id. at 775.
204 Id.
2o 642 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
2 5 Id. at 858. The second plane was able to make a safe landing.
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bly suffered emotionally before the impact.
2 0 6
Although Texas courts do not label the suffering prior
to impact as "pre-impact fear," the description by Texas
courts of the fear that death is imminent seems to be the
same. As of yet, the Texas Supreme Court has not ex-
pressly addressed pre-impact fear, and therefore, the
court's position is unclear. However, other courts have
allowed recovery for pre-impact fear.
B. Aircrash Litigation
This section shifts the focus of this article to cases in-
volving passengers and their recoveries for pain and suf-
fering. Although the majority of these cases involve
decedents of air crashes, similar principles apply to the
survivors. The most significant difference is that the dece-
dents' estates must prove their pain and suffering by cir-
cumstantial evidence, whereas the survivors may testify as
to their suffering.
Airplane crash cases have considered recovery for the
decedents' and survivors' pre-impact pain and suffering
caused by the apprehension of death prior to the crash. 0 7
The courts consider a pre-impact award in light of the
pain and suffering damages.2 °8 As discussed above,
''pain" is thought of as physical pain following impact or
trauma. 20 9 "Suffering" is the emotional distress arising
from such pain. 210 Even though the suffering may con-
tinue after the pain subsides, the courts consider pain and
suffering together in determining the recovery.2 1' Conse-
quently, to sustain a recovery for damages as a result of
pain and suffering, the courts do not require physical
pain; emotional suffering will suffice for a damage
award. 2  As a logical extension, the impact, injury and
2W Id. at 859.
207 See infra notes 221-249 and accompanying text.
208 Fuchsberg, supra note 176, at 31.
2(X) Id. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
210 Fuchsberg, supra note 176, at 31. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
"' See Fuchsberg, supra note 176, at 31.
212 Id.
pain, becomes irrelevant, thus allowing damages for pre-
impact suffering.21
3
Furthermore, commentators suggest that recovery for
pre-impact fear began as a result of courts allowing recov-
ery for negligent infliction of emotional distress without
requiring impact. 2 4 As one commentator noted, by al-
lowing recovery for pre-impact fear courts are merely af-
firming two established principles.21 5 The first principle
states that one may recover damages in the absence of any
impact; that is, damages for emotional distress induced by
fear of one's own safety, i.e. the zone of danger rule. The
second principle asserts that a decedent's heir can recover
for post-impact pain and suffering. If it can be shown that
the decedent regained consciousness after impact, the
courts argued that it was illogical to extinguish or merge a
pre-impact fear claim into a wrongful death action.2 16
As noted above, pre-impact fear cases are often difficult
to prove, especially if everyone on board the plane is
killed.21 7 In addition, the claim is based on a brief period
in which the passenger is fearful of death.21 8 As a conse-
quence, the awards are generally not very large.21 9 In
spite of these difficulties, plaintiffs have recovered in sev-
eral cases for pre-impact fear.22 °
An Illinois federal court considered pre-impact pain
and suffering damage recovery as a result of the May 25,
213 Id.
2 4 Id.
2 5 Id. at 30-31 for discussion of these principles.
216 Id.
217 All persons died who were on board the American Airlines DC-10 that
crashed in Chicago, Illinois as well as those on the Pan Am flight that crashed in
Kenner, Louisiana. See infra notes 221-235 &242-249 and accompanying text.
2133 Often, the time span between the realization of impending danger and im-
pact is only thirty to sixty seconds. See Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
574 F. Supp. 1407, 1417 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (American Airlines Flight 191 was only
airborne for 31 seconds before crashing).
219 See Shu-Tao Lin, 574 F. Supp. at 1409. (Before remittitur, the jury awarded
$7,000,000 for pecuniary loss and $10,000 for pain and suffering. Id. The court
allowed the $10,000 recovery for pain and suffering, but ordered a remittitur to
$4,264,500 for the pecuniary loss. Id.
2233 See infra notes 229-231 & 236-249 and accompaning text.
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1979 crash of an American Airlines DC-10 that occured
shortly after take off from Chicago's O'Hare International
Airport.221 In a memorandum opinion issued in 1983, the
federal district court ruled that under Illinois law a com-
plaint may state a cause of action that includes pre-impact
pain and suffering. 222 This opinion demonstrates how a
court first began allowing recovery for pre-impact fear.
The decision was based on a 1983 ruling by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority.223 In
Rickey the court abandoned the impact rule,2 24 and
adopted the zone of danger rule.225 As one commentator
recognized, if a state has adopted a zone of danger rule,
recovery for pre-impact fear could be allowed under the
same theory as zone of danger.2 26 Neither an action re-
questing damages for pre-impact fear nor the zone-of-
danger action requires impact.
Two important cases arising from the Chicago crash
2' Shu-Tao Lin, 574 F. Supp. at 1409.
' In re Aircrash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 18 Av. Cas.
(CCH) 17,215 (N.D. Ill. 1983). This memorandum opinion reversed a 1980 rul-
ing which held that pre-impact pain and suffering was not compensible under Illi-
nois law. Id. For the 1980 rulings, see DeYoung v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 507
F. Supp. 21 (N.D. I1. 1980).
2 98 I1. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983).
24 For an earlier decision relying on the impact rule, see DeYoung, 507 F. Supp.
at 21. This case was decided as a result of the DC- 10 crash in Chicago. Id. The
court held that a survival action could not be maintained for the victim's fright
and terror allegedly experienced prior to impact. Id. at 23. The court relied on
Illinois' interpretation of the impact rule and held that the victim could recover
damages for emotional distress only when it was caused by physical injury. Id. The
court, however, did state that the victim could recover for any pain and suffering
which she may have experienced after the plane crashed but before death. Id. at
24.
22 Rickey, 457 N.E.2d at 5. In Rickey, an eight year old witnessed an accident in
which his five year old brother became entangled in an escalator. Id. at 2. The five
year old never regained consciousness. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court specifically
refused to create the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress because it
would allow recovery to anyone who suffered a "direct emotional impact" when
he witnessed an injury to a close relative. Id. at 4 (citing Dillon, 441 P.2d at 912).
However, the court did adopt the zone of physical danger rule that allows a by-
stander to recover if he has a reasonable fear for his own safety. Rickev, 457 N.E.2d
at 5. The zone of danger rule does not require that the bystander suffer physical
impact, but the bystander must show physical injury or illness as a result of the
emotional distress caused by defendant's negligence. Id.
2211 See supra notes 215-216 and accompanying text.
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and applying New York law for pre-impact pain and suf-
fering are Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.2 2 7 and
Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 228 In Shu-Tao Lin, a New
York federal district court allowed a $10,000 award for
pre-impact pain and suffering experienced by Dr. Lin.229
Relying on circumstantial evidence, the court concluded
that a reasonable juror might infer that Dr. Lin observed
the left engine break off during takeoff since he was as-
signed a left rear window seat.23" Furthermore, even if
Dr. Lin did not observe the damage, the sudden change in
the plane's altitude, from steep ascent to sharp descent
would have notified him of the impending disaster.23 '
In a second pre-impact fear case arising from the same
Chicago crash, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit ruled that it would be sheer speculation to
infer that a passenger on the flight was aware of his im-
pending death.232 In Shatkin, the court noted that Mr.
Shatkin was seated on the right side of the plane.233 From
that seat he could not have seen that the left engine had
fallen off.23 4 The court concluded that the evidence did
not show that the passengers were notified or became
aware of the danger.235 In comparing Shu-Tao Lin and
Shatkin it becomes evident that the proof for pre-impact
fear is highly circumstantial in airplane crashes which
leave no survivors. As a result, recovery is dependent
upon the extent of speculation in which each court will
indulge.
The use of circumstantial evidence to prove pre-impact
fear is especially significant in the Fifth Circuit's decision
227 574 F. Supp. at 1407.
22s 727 F.2d 202 (2d.Cir. 1984).
221, Shu-Tao Lin, 574 F. Supp. at 1417.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Shatkin, 727 F.2d at 206.
233 Id.
234 Id.
2s. Id. The court additionally stated, "[als far as the record is concerned
Shatkin could have dozed off in his seat." Id. at 207.
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of Solomon v. Warren.23 6 Solomon involved a Cessna 337
Super Skymaster aircraft which was presumed lost at
sea. 23 7 Plaintiff, the personal representative of the Levin's
estate, brought an action under the Florida Survival Stat-
ute claiming that the Levins, passengers aboard the plane,
suffered conscious pain and suffering prior to their
death.238 The court agreed, relying on the evidence that
the pilot radioed to the Barbados Tower stating that the
fuel gauges on the aircraft read empty and that he in-
tended to ditch the aircraft at sea. 2 39 The court found that
from this evidence a reasonable inference could be made
that the plaintiffs appreciated the possibility of imminent
death, at least from the time of the radio transmission, 240
and there was no reason to doubt that the pilot did in fact
ditch the plane.24'
The most recent case allowing damages for pre-impact
fear is Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. 242 This case in-
volved the July 9, 1982 Pan Am crash in Kenner, Louisi-
ana, killing all 146 people on board.243 The court stated
the issue as whether "the fear a decedent experiences
prior to both death and physical impact is a legally com-
pensable element of damages. 24 4 Defendant Pan Am ar-
gued that no evidence existed of the decedent's
"conscious" pre-impact fear because there were no survi-
vors or eyewitnesses who saw the path or trajectory of the
plane prior to the crash.245 The only evidence offered was
a videotape simulation of the takeoff and crash, a stipula-
tion explaining facts from the investigation, and a video-
236 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
2.17 Id. at 780.
258 Id. at 792.
'2.9 Id. at 792-93.
240 Id. at 792.
241 Id. at 793.
242 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984).
24.1 Id. at 313.
244 Id. (emphasis by court). The court noted the apparently undisputed fact that
the Pan Am 727 disintegrated and the decedent died immediately upon impact
with the ground. Id.
24. Id. at 315.
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tape of expert testimony.246 In considering the evidence,
the court stated, "a damages award cannot stand when the
only evidence to support it is speculative or purely conjec-
tural. ' 24 7 However, in this case, the court found that the
inference was more than "reasonable" that the decedent
apprehended his death prior to the final impact.248
Therefore, the court allowed recovery for pre-impact fear
based on circumstantial evidence.249
III. APPLICATION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES TO
THE BYSTANDERS AND SURVIVORS OF DELTA
FLIGHT 191
A. Bystanders
The terror and tragedy of Delta Flight 191 are evident.
For those who died, the pain and suffering is over. How-
ever, for the victims' families, survivors, witnesses, and
rescuers, the emotional distress will last indefinitely.25 °
Because the crash occurred on a Friday evening, the high-
246 Id. The parties stipulated that:
the Pan Am plane took off and rose to an altitude of 163 feet before
beginning its fatal descent. While the plane rolled to its left, testi-
mony indicated there was no change in gravitational forces. The
plane's wing struck a tree fifty-three feet above ground, and the air-
craft rolled, impacted and disintegrated some four to six seconds
later.
Id. at 315-16.
247 Id. at 316.
248 Id. at 317.
249 Id. The court noted that the apprehension was at least from the time the
wing struck a tree. Id. In addition, the court considered that the defendant's own
expert testified that when the passengers experienced a "violent change in the
plane, the last couple of seconds, [they] certainly would have been thrown about
and fighting for their lives" (emphasis in original) Id. at 316. But see Feldman v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Conn. 1974). Where the court did
not allow recovery for pre-impact pain and suffering. Id. This was in spite of the
fact that two passengers and a co-pilot survived. Id. The court concluded that the
survivor was alert to the situation because he was monitoring the plane's descent
by looking out the window. Id. at 206. It would be too speculative, however, to
award damages for decedent's pain and suffering. Id.
2m0 Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 5, 1985, at A5, col. 5. See also Dallas Times Her-
aid, Aug. 7, 1985, at A 10, col. 1-5 for a discussion of the aftermath effects of past
plane crashes to survivors and bystanders.
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ways were crawling with weekend travelers driving to and
from the D/FW airport.2 5 Consequently, many people
witnessed the wide-bodied Delta Airlines plane struggling
through the sky and skidding off Highway 114.252 Work-
ers at the airport saw the crash and swarmed the wreckage
to look for survivors. Additionally, relatives and on look-
ers saw the plane come down while waiting for its arrival.
This Comment will now apply the principles for emo-
tional distress, specifically the impact,2 53 zone of danger 2 54
and Dillon 25 5 tests to the different categories of bystanders
of the Delta crash. Bystanders can be grouped depending
upon where they were located or their relationship to the
victims of the crash. The first group of bystanders to be
analyzed is the Highway 114 travelers. Second, the Com-
ment will discuss the possible cause of actions for persons
involved in the crash cleanup. Third, the possible causes
of action by the passive bystanders who were not relatives
of the crash victims will be analyzed. Finally, the Com-
ment will focus on the claims by the passive bystanders
who were relatives to the victims of the crash.
1. Highway 114 Travelers
The first category of bystanders include all drivers on
Highway 114 who witnessed the crash. A giant landing
wheel slammed into one of the bystander's car, although
the driver apparently was not injured. 256 However, a
Texas court may consider this an "impact" or at least find
that the driver was in the zone of danger. He may there-
fore have a claim for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress against the party held liable for the crash. 57 To
2' Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 3, 1985, at A23, col. 1.
252 Id.
213 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
2.4 See supra notes 42-60 and accompanying text.
255 See supra note 70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Dillon factors.
' .6 NEWSWEEK, supra note 3, at 30.
2-.7 See also supra notes 89-109 and accompanying text. It must also be noted that
whether physical manifestations must arise as a result of the infliciton of emo-
tional distress is presently unsettled under Texas law. Id. At the writing of this
Comment, it has not been determined who, if anyone, will be held liable for the
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satisfy the "impact" test, the driver will be required to
prove that the defendant set some force in motion that
"contacted" him. This will include proving that the con-
tact to his car was sufficient to constitute contact to his
person.258 If this bystander is unable to prove that he was
"impacted", he might be successful in a suit for negligent
infliction of emotional distress by showing that he was in
the zone of danger. If the court finds that he was in the
zone of danger, then it will not be necessary to show that
he meets the Dillon requirements. The bystander will only
have to prove, according to the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals' holding in Perez, that he reasonably feared for his
own safety when the landing gear struck his car.259
The other drivers can also claim to have been in the
zone of danger depending on their location on Highway
114 at the exact moment the plane skidded across the
highway. 260 Three vehicles smashed into each other while
watching the horror and at least twelve other minor acci-
dents occurred. 261 Those who suffered emotional distress
but were not personally injured may also have a cause of
crash; that case is now presently set for trial on April 27, 1987. However Delta
Airlines has offered to settle with the plaintiffs if they do not claim punitive dam-
ages. See supra note 11. The transcript of the conversation between the crew of
Delta 191, other airplanes in the area, and the controller suggests that wind shear
was the cause of the crash. However, the captain of Delta 191, Connors, stated
prior to the crash, "[h]e's sleeping; get him out of bed." It is unclear whether he
was referring to the controller or the flight engineer. Dallas Times Herald, Oct. 1,
1985, at A8, col. 3. Consequently, there may be a claim that the controllers were
not aware of the weather (some of the weather observers at the control center
were out for dinner) or that they did not communicate the weather situation to the
crew of Flight 191. Id. at col. 2. However, it is reported that pilots who landed
just seconds before Flight 191 crashed had recognized the bad storm conditions
but did not report them in time. Id. at col. 1.
2,5 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "impact"
rule.
259 See supra note 43 and accompanying text for a definition of the zone of dan-
ger rule.
2- Behind the Toyota, whose occupant was decapitated, the drivers of two cars
and a tractor trailer rig "watched the developing scene in horror as they slammed
on their brakes to avoid the plunging jet." Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 3, 1985, at
A23, col. 2.
26 1 Id. Some of these accidents resulted from the blinding rain as well as the
plane crash. Id.
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action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. If
they actually feared for their safety then their cause of ac-
tion can be proven by showing they were in the zone of
danger. If they cannot prove they were in the zone of dan-
ger they will have to meet all three Dillon factors as
adopted by Landreth. Courts may also consider the ex-
panded rules of Dillon. These include Grizzle and Davis
which extend contemporary perception and Baber and
Vlach which do not require physical manifestations for
claims of mental anguish. However, the lack of a relation-
ship between these drivers and the passengers (unless of
course the drivers were picking up a relative at the airport
who was on the plane) will probably preclude recovery in
Texas.
2. Bystanders Participating in the Crash Cleanup
Another class of bystanders may attempt to bring suit
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. These by-
standers were not in the zone of danger, and satisfying the
foreseeability test of Dillon and Landreth will be difficult.262
These bystanders arrived after the crash occurred to
search for survivors, clean up debris263 or film the trag-
edy.2 64 Because the helpers were probably not relatives,
the relationship factor of the foreseeability requirement
will not be met and therefore a cause of action for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress will be difficult to
prove.
Many people started helping officials look through deb-
ris for survivors immediately following the crash. Rever-
end Gregory Schweer vividly recalls seeing "badly burned
bodies, grotesquely intertwined with expressions of hor-
21;2 See supra note 60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Dillon factors
of foreseeability. See also supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text for the adop-
tion of the Dillon factors by the Landreth court.
263 See infra notes 265-275 and accompanying text.
2'W See, e.g., Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 7, 1985, at A10, col. 5. A television cam-
eraman who filmed the 1978 San Diego collision of a Pacific Southwest Airline
and a small aircraft reported seeing wreckage and bodies every time he subse-
quently tried to look through the camera lens. Id.
ror on the faces."' 2 65 A paramedic and lawyer, Jack Ayers,
said "[i]t wasn't the appearance of the scene or the inju-
ries that bothered me. The hardest part was. . .being un-
able to do anything for most of the victims. '"266 Another
volunteer from Orion Air Service collapsed with chest
pains while searching in tall weeds for survivors.26 7
The emotional distress that results from a tragic crash
lingers long afterwards. Since many rescuers have been
trained to handle disasters, they feel the need to hide
their feelings. 2 68 However, within five days of the Delta
crash, the Dallas Police Department psychologists con-
sulted with thirty-two officers or paramedics who had ex-
perienced flashbacks, depression, and insomnia.26 9The
courts may have to consider whether these "bystanders"
have a valid cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
In deciding whether to permit claims by rescuers,
courts may ultimately look to the Fifth Circuit decision in
Leconte for guidance.2 v° In Leconte, rescue workers were
not allowed to recover damages for mental distress that
they suffered while searching for dead bodies at the crash
site because the court held that Louisiana law prohibited
any type of bystander recovery for mental anguish.2 7 '
While it would seem that Leconte is authority for dis-
missing claims by rescue workers, it should be noted that
the Fifth Circuit applied Louisana's general rule against
bystander recovery without taking into account the
unique fact situation that case presented.
A court applying Texas law will probably apply the Dil-
lon factors to determine whether the emotional distress
261 Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 5, 1985, at A5, col. 5.
2 Id. Ayers also stated that "[tihere were things I did out there I don't think I'll
ever tell anyone about-things one human being doesn't tell another human be-
ing." Id. at col. 6.
267 Id. John Dandois spent more than 20 hours in the coronary care unit of a
local hospital before being released. Id.
2,18 Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 7, 1985, at A10, col. 5.
269 Id.
27,, See supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text for a discussion of Leconte.
21, See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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suffered by rescue workers is foreseeable. 272 The second
factor of the Dillon test requires that the plaintiff suffer a
direct emotional impact from the sensory and contempo-
raneous observance of the accident.273 Since many of the
Delta rescue workers were near the scene when the crash
occurred and their shock resulted from either observing
the crash contemporaneously or from being "brought so
close to the reality of the accident", they will be able to
satisfy Dillon's second requirement. 274 However, the third
factor, the existence of a close relationship between the
plaintiff and the victim, may be difficult to prove.27 5
Therefore, based on an analysis of the Dillon factors, it is
most likely that a Texas court will find that it was not fore-
seeable that "bystanders" who came to the aid of victims
and cleaned up debris would suffer emotional distress.
3. Passive Bystanders - Non-relatives
The third category of bystanders that may seek dam-
ages for negligent infliction of emotional distress includes
those who were at some distance from the scene of the
Delta crash but were not related to the passengers or crew
aboard the flight. 276 One witness who watched the crash
stated, "[i]t was . . . the most frightening thing I ever
seen [sic]" ' 2 77 and some felt that the crash scene looked
like a "disaster on a movie set."'2 78 People in nearby ho-
tels saw the tragedy occur and felt the earth shake from
impact.2 79 Others were at work at the airport and ob-
272 See supra note 70 and accompanying text for the factors espoused in Dillon.
273 Id.
271 See supra note 125 and accompanying text for the application of the second
Dillon factor in Davis.
27.1 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
271 Carol Thompson walked outside her Grapevine, Texas home to take a pic-
ture of a rainbow. Instead, she was just in time to watch Delta 191 descending in
the southeast sky through a violent rain squall. But this flight was different from
the many others she had seen. Mrs. Thompson observed it plunge abruptly
downward to the ground. Id. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, supra note 3, at 30.
217 Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 3, 1985, at A24, col. I.
278 Id.
271, Id. at col. 3. Brock Minton, who watched from the tenth floor of the airport
hotel said, "[tihere was a heavy downpour and several bolts of lightening . ...
served the catastrophic ball of fire and commotion that
followed the crash. 280 These people may attempt to bring
a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, although it is unlikely they will recover under the
Dillon and Landreth analysis. Most will not meet the re-
quirement that a close relationship exists between the vic-
tim and the bystander.28 '
4. Passive Bystanders - Relatives
The final category of bystanders is comprised of the rel-
atives of the crew and passengers of Delta 191. The rela-
tives, who waited at the Delta terminal for the arrival of
their loved ones on Flight 191, may satisfy all three of the
Dillon and Landreth factors.28 2 In applying the Dillon factors
to actions brought by relatives, Texas courts will probably
find that a sufficiently close relationship existed in each
case between the plaintiff and the victim so as to satisfy
Dillon's third requirement.28 3 Once the close relationship
is established, the jury will decide whether the other two
requirements are met: first, that the plaintiff was located
near the accident 2 4 and second that the plaintiff contem-
poraneously observed the accident.28 5 It is likely that a
jury would find that the relatives were located near
enough to the accident to satisfy that aspect of the Dillon
analysis. However, each case will have to be examined on
All of a sudden the outline of the plane was barely off the ground. It barely
cleared the highway and then wiped out at least one car. Nothing was left of the
car but a metal frame." Id.
The hotel manager of the Holiday Inn less than one mile away reported that the
hotel was shaken by the crash. He said "[i]t felt like lightening had struck or some-
thing. We saw from the lobby a fireballs big as the hotel itself." Id.
28o See Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 5, 1985, at A5, col. 5. One witness, a Vietnam
veteran, was working on the runway. He stated "[w]hen you've got people out
there screaming and hollering, you move. I saw mass confusion. There was not
enough spontaneous reaction." Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 3, 1985, at A24, col.
3.
'2H1 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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its own set of facts to determine whether the relative "by-
stander" contemporaneously experienced the accident,
or, instead, was notified by Delta officials that the crash
had occurred.28 6 Whether each relative will have a cause
of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, will
turn on his or her testimony concerning how knowledge
of the accident was actually experienced.
If any of the relatives received erroneous information
from Delta officials that loved ones were not on board
Flight 191, when in fact they were, then they may have
claims for emotional distress similar to the ones ad-
dressed in Wood.287 They may also claim that Delta negli-
gently caused them mental anguish by delays in the
release of information regarding the fate of the passen-
gers. However, it is questionable that in cases where rela-
tives are mistakenly told that a loved one was aboard an
ill-fated flight, when in fact he or she was not, that a court
would allow recovery for mental distress. It seems that
the relatives should simply be thankful that their loved
one was not a victim of the crash.
Unlike the Wood case, which was decided under Utah
law and only allows recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional distress if there no proof of physical injury,
Texas may allow recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress without proof of bodily physical injury.288
Therefore, a relative in Texas who was given wrong infor-
mation may need only prove that the mental anguish was
foreseeable, using the Dillon analysis outlined above, and
that the act was the proximate cause of his distress.289
Furthermore, since a relative's emotional trauma is cer-
tainly foreseeable under these circumstances, the relatives
will probably have a good cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
286 See supra notes 70 & 110-125 and accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 110-133 and accompanying text for a discussion of the IW'ood
case.
288 See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
2111 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
Other relatives of the victims or survivors, having dis-
covered the news of the crash through a third party may
attempt to recover damages for emotional distress. In
similar cases such as Saxton2 90 and Saunders,29 1 courts have
denied recovery. By applying the Dillon factors Texas
courts would probably hold that plaintiffs who learned of
the incident second-hand have an unforeseeable claim.
For any bystander, recovery will depend upon whether
there are any physical manifestations that result from the
emotional distress. In Texas, it is still unsettled whether a
plaintiff may recover for mental anguish without accompa-
nying physical injury or physical manifestations.2 92 How-
ever, the Texas Supreme Court will probably uphold the
Baber decision which states that no physical injury is re-
quired to recover for damages for emotional distress.293
If the supreme court holds otherwise, a plaintiff may feign
headaches, insomnia and flashbacks in order to recover.
B. Survivors
Unlike Chicago, Illinois and Kenner, Louisiana plane
crashes, several people miraculously survived the Delta
Flight 191 crash. Survivors made statements to news re-
porters shortly after the crash indicating their fears.29"
One of the more publicized survivors is Jay Slusher, a
computer programmer from Phoenix, Arizona. Slusher
stated: "The ride got rougher and rougher. It seemed
like there was something on top of the plane, pushing it to
the ground. The pilot tried to pull out of it. The speed of
the engines increased. We started rocking back and forth.
Then we were tossed all around. I saw an orange streak
2- 428 F. Supp. at 1051-53. For a discussion of Saxton, see supra notes 137-143
and accompanying text.
2, 558 F. Supp. at 1233. For a discussion of Saunders, see supra notes 131-156
and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 89-109 and accompanying text.
211, Baber, 672 S.W.2d at 298-99.
2,See infra notes 295-297 for statements made by survivors. Since pre-impact
fear proof is often circumstantial for those who die, it may be helpful to know
what the passengers were doing and what the survivors were thinking during the
tragic descent of Flight 191.
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coming toward me on the left side of the floor. I thought
we were going to explode. At that point, I said, 'well, it's
all over.' 291 Slusher also stated "we started making
some pretty drastic turns [sic] but I thought that was to
maneuver around the thunder storms. ' 296 Another survi-
vor stated, "I saw the ground. I thought we were landing.
There was one bump, then another bump, and the plane
fell apart. I can't explain it." 29 7
Survivors of tragic accidents commonly receive larger
recoveries than those who die instantly. 298 The reason for
the disparity is that survivors recover for their mental and
physical pain and suffering in addition to reimbursement
for medical bills and lost earnings.299 Survivors may en-
dure several common forms of emotional scars, including
sleeplessness, nightmares, anxiety, and recurrent
thoughts of the crash. °° In addition, many survivors ex-
perience feelings of guilt because they survived while so
many others died °.3 0  This area of recovery for survivors is
confusing because it can additionally be argued that survi-
vors are bystanders who suffer mental anguish as a result
of their postion in the zone of danger and observation of
others being killed.
The Delta survivors may recover damages for personal
injuries, including pain and suffering. 0 2 In addition,
courts applying Texas law will have to consider recovery
of a survivor's emotional damages due to pre-impact
fear.303 Port Terminal304 and Zondler315 can be persuasive
21M TIME, supra note 1, at 18.
296 Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 3, 1985, at A24, col. 2.
297 Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 4, 1985, at A20, col. 4.
290, Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 7, 1985, at A17, col. 3.
2M) Id.
Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 7, 1985, at A10, col. 1.
Io, d. Initially, survivors try to deny emotional responses. However, the depres-
sion and flashbacks set in within 3-4 weeks. Id. A sense of loneliness makes it
difficult for survivors to cope. Normally the whole community is involved in a
disaster i.e. a flood or hurricane. In a plane crash, however, only scattered mem-
bers of a community are injured or killed. Id. at col. 2.
302 See supra notes 172-185 and accompanying text.
303 See supra notes 186-206 and accompanying text.
- Port Terminal, 640 S.W.2d at 367.
in this area. Both cases held that a decedent's estate can
recover for the time the decedent feared he would die.
However, the courts will have to extend this potential
damage recovery to airplane crash survivors.
The question of whether the survivors suffered pre-im-
pact fear is a question for the trier of fact.3 °6 Where the
plaintiff was sitting or any remarks made before impact
will be considered as circumstantial evidence in determin-
ing pre-impact fear for decedents and survivors. As in
Lin,3 0 7 Shatkin 31 8 and Solomon, 30 9 a court's determination
of recovery of these damages will depend upon the partic-
ular situation and facts surrounding each plaintiff.
Pre-impact fear is a new issue for Texas courts in the
context of a major commercial air crash.3 10 However,
"suffering" during the time a person thinks he is going to
die (or knows it) can be more intense than suffering that
results from an injury. In this author's opinion, the courts
will have to expressly confront this issue and should allow
for pre-impact pain and suffering in order to compensate
the survivors.3 1
IV. CONCLUSION
The horror of Flight 191 is not over. Many will suffer
emotional damages from the memories of witnessing the
crash, cleaning up the wreckage, and surviving the trag-
edy. Although these people can potentially bring lawsuits
to recover for their damages, courts will most likely con-
strue the claims in light of foreseeability. The courts wish
to protect defendants from voluminous litigation, specu-
30-0 Zondler, 683 S.W.2d at 775.
- In Texas, damage issues are determined by the trier of fact. Fuchsberg, supra
note 176, at 31.
307 Shu-Tao Lin, 574 F. Supp. at 1407.
som Shatkin, 727 F.2d at 202.
sot, Solomon, 540 F.2d at 777.
-1o However, they have considered the issue in a different context and allowed
recovery. See infra notes 186-206 and accompanying text.
.4" Although it is more difficult to prove, it is likely that those who died also
suffered pre-impact fear and the plaintiff bringing the claim under the Survival
Act should recover.
1986] COMMENT 1083
1084 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
lative claims and burdensome unlimited liability. Unless a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by a by-
stander, family member or other affected party meets the
foreseeability standards in Dillon, a Texas court will prob-
ably deny recovery. But, once a plaintiff satisfies the Dillon
factors, Texas will probably not require a showing of
physical manifestations resulting from the distress. If the
courts do require a showing of physical manifestation,
plaintiffs will be encouraged to fabricate headaches, nau-
sea, or insomnia to secure recovery.
Texas courts will also probably allow monetary awards
for pre-impact pain and suffering to the survivors of the
crash. Negligent infliction of emotional distress broadens
the scope of pain and suffering. Pre-impact fear is where
the two theories overlap. The survivors, who realized that
death was near, themselves suffered pre-impact fear and
as a "bystander" in the zone of danger observed others
experiencing injury. Therefore, a survivor should be able
to recover damages for pre-impact fear or damages for
the action of negligent infliction of emotional distress.3 1
With the multitude of claims that will likely result from
the Delta crash, the litigation will provide an opportunity
for the courts to define the area of damage recoveries for
mental anguish. The author hopes that the courts will
clarify the ambiguities created in the past.
:1" The allocation of the economic risk is an important consideration for the
court in determining whether these potential plaintiffs should recover. However,
that issue is discussed elsewhere. See Note, Loss Shifting and Quasi-negigence: A Aeu
Interpretation of the Palsgraf Case, 8 U. Cm. I. RF~v. 729 (1941).
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